Lie Detection: The Supreme Court\u27s Polygraph Decision by Gershman, Bennett L.
Pace University 
DigitalCommons@Pace 
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law 
9-1998 
Lie Detection: The Supreme Court's Polygraph Decision 
Bennett L. Gershman 
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bennett L. Gershman, Lie Detection: The Supreme Court's Polygraph Decision, N.Y. St. B.J., Sept./Oct. 
1998, at 34, http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/622/. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. 
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
HeinOnline -- 70 N.Y. St. B.J. 34 1998
~ 
IIiU NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL 
Lie Detection: THE SUPREME 
COURT'S POLYGRAPH DECISION 
By BENNETT L. GERSHMAN 
Detecting deception by exam-ining bodily changes is not a new phenomenon. More than 4,000 years ago the Chinese tried an accused in 
the presence of a physician who, listen-
ing to the heartbeat, would announce 
whether the accused was lying. The 
bedouins required suspected liars to lick 
a hot iron-a burned tongue was a sign 
oflying. In England the test was to swal-
Iowa "trial slice" of bread and cheese-
inability to swallow revealed deception.! 
Modern lie detection operates 
roughly on the same principle. Questions 
are put to the subject by a qualified ex-
aminer while a polygraph device moni-
tors and records internal stresses from 
changes in blood pressure, pulse rate, res-
piration rate and perspiration. A compari-
son of responses to "control" questions 
("Did you have breakfast?") with "rel-
evant" questions ("Did you use drugs?") 
may reveal that the subject is lying.2 
Although the rate of accuracy of 
polygraph testing is claimed to range 
from 70% to well over 90%,3 American 
courts traditionally have been hostile to 
the admission of any evidence concern-
ing the administration or results of a 
polygraph examination. For fifty years 
since Frye v. United States,4 the seminal 
polygraph case, virtually all courts ad-
hered to a rule of unconditional exclu-
sion.5 Inadmissibility was based on the 
unreliability of the test, the lack of stan-
dardized procedures, and the prejudicial 
impact on the jury. Principal concerns 
articulated by courts have been (1) the 
aura of infallibility of such evidence, (2) 
resistance to admitting an opinion on an 
ultimate issue, (3) infringement on the 
jury's role in determining credibility, and 
(4) undue consumption of judicial re-
sources from such testimony.6 
In United States v. Scheffer,? de-
cided this past Term, the Supreme Court 
considered for the first time the admis-
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sibility of polygraph evidence.8 The 
Court held that exclusion of such evi-
dence on behalf of a criminal defendant 
was supported by valid justifications and 
offended no constitutional right to 
present a defense. The case produced 
three opinions. The principal opinion by 
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Souter, 
reflected the traditional hostility to poly-
graph evidence and articulated the tradi-
tional justifications for categorical 
exclusion. A concurring opinion by Jus-
tice Kennedy, joined by Justices 
O'Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer, while 
agreeing with the result, criticized much 
of the reasoning in the principal opinion 
and adopted a more nuanced approach 
to the admissibility of polygraph evi-
dence. Justice Stevens, in a powerful dis-
sent, noted the incongruity between the 
government's extensive use of poly-
graphs to make vital security determina-
tions and its argument in Scheffer 
stressing the inaccuracy of the tests. 
Given the obvious tension between 
Scheffer and the Court's landmark deci-
sion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc. 9 on the admissibility 
of scientific evidence generally, the dis-
comfort by five Justices over a categori-
cal rule of exclusion, and the modem 
trend of limited admissibility of poly-
graph evidence, it is likely that the Court 
will again revisit the admissibility of 
polygraph evidence in a different fac-
tual context, and the result next time 
might well be different. 
Background 
Scheffer, an airman, was tried by a 
court-martial on charges of knowingly 
using methamphetamine. A urinalysis 
indicated that he had ingested the sub-
stance, but his defense was that he was 
unaware of the ingestion. He so testi-
fied, and attempted to support his testi-
mony by introducing the results of a lie 
detector test which was administered to 
him at the government's request, and 
which in the opinion of the government's 
polygraph examiner confirmed the truth-
fulness of Scheffer's testimony. Al-
though the prosecution had selected the 
polygraph examiner, the equipment, the 
testing procedures, and the questions 
asked of the defendant, and argued 
throughout the trial that Scheffer "is a 
liar," it objected to the admissibility of 
the polygraph results, citing Military 
Rule of Evidence 707,10 which categori-
1 1 McCormick on Evidence § 206, at 
907 U. Strong 4th ed. 1992). 
2 Moenssens, Inbau & Starrs, Scientific 
Evidence in Criminal Cases, § 14.07, at 704· 
07 (3d ed. 1986). 
3 Id. § 14.09, at 712. See also United 
States v. Oliver, 525 F. 2d 731, 737 (8th 
Cir. 1975) (expert polygrapher testifies to 
accuracy rate over 90%). 
4293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
5 New York is one of the jurisdictions 
adopting the per se rule of exclusion. See 
People v. Leone, 25 N.Y. 2d 511 (1969). 
6 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F. 
2d 1529, 1532-33 (11 th Cir. 1989); Brown 
v. Darcy, 783 F. 2d 1389, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 
1986). Notwithstanding the general rule of 
exclusion, prosecutors have committed 
reversible misconduct by eliciting proof that 
the defendant failed the test, United States v. 
Brevard, 739 F. 2d 180 (4th Cir. 1984), that 
a key witness passed the test, Commonwealth 
v. Kemp, 410 A. 2d 870 (Pa. Super. 1979), 
or indirectly proving that the witness took the 
test, leaving the inescapable inference that the 
witness passed the test. State v. Kilpatrick, 
578 P. 2d 1147 (Kan. 1978); People v. 
Brocato, 169 N.W. 2d 483 (Mich. 1969). 
Even proof of a witness' Willingness or 
unwillingness to take a lie detector test is 
error. United States v. Martino, 648 F. 2d 
367 (5th Cir. 1981). 
7118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998). 
B In Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S. Ct. 7 
(1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a state 
prosecutor's failure to disclose to the defense 
that a key prosecution witness had failed a 
polygraph test did not deprive of exculpatory 
evidence. The Court noted that" disclosure of 
the poly_graph results could have had no 
direct effect on the outcome of the trial, 
because [the defense] could have made no 
mention of them either during argument or 
while questioning witnesses." Id. at 10. 
9 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See United States 
v. Cordoba, 104 F. 3d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 
1997) (" a per se rule excluding polygraph 
evidence was overruled by Daubed'); United 
States v. Posado, 57 F. 3d 428, 431-34 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (Daubert "remove[d] the obstacle 
of the per se rule against admissibility"). 
10 Rule 707 states: "(a) Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the law, the results of a 
polygraph examination, the opinion of a 
polygraph examiner, or any reference to an 
offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a 
polygraph examination, shall not be admitted 
into evidence." There is no counterpart to 
Military Rule of Evidence 707 in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
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cally excludes polygraph evidence. The 
military judge sustained the objection, 
and the Air Force Court of Criminal 
Appeals affirmed en bancY However, 
the United States Court of Military Ap-
peals reversed, holding that a per se ex-
clusion of polygraph evidence offered 
by an accused to rebut an attack on his 
credibility violates his Sixth Amendment 
right to present a defense. 12 
Supreme Court Opinions 
The principal opinion by Justice 
Thomas began by noting the familiar 
principle that the right to present evi-
dence is subject to reasonable restric-
tions, and that rules excluding evidence 
will be upheld so long as they are not 
"arbitrary" or "disproportionate" to the 
purposes they are designed to serve.13 
Rule 707' s categorical ban on polygraph 
evidence serves several legitimate pur-
poses, according to the principal opin-
ion, including (1) ensuring that only 
reliable evidence is introduced at trial, 
(2) preserving the jury's role in deter-
mining credibility, and (3) avoiding liti-
gation into collateral issues. Given the 
fact that "the scientific community re-
mains extremely polarized about the re-
liability of polygraph techniques," the 
risk that juries will give excessive weight 
to the opinions of a polygrapher, and 
the time-consuming "collateral" litiga-
tion over the admissibility of polygraph 
evidence, exclusion of such evidence "is 
neither arbitrary nor disproportionate in 
promoting these ends."14 The Court also 
held that Rule 707 does not implicate 
any "significant" or "sufficiently 
weighty" interest of the defendant, and 
therefore is distinguishable from the 
Court's precedents invalidating on con-
stitutional grounds evidentiary rules that 
excluded a defendant's hypnotically re-
freshed testimony,15 an accomplice's tes-
timony,16 and a third party's confession. 17 
Here, Scheffer was neither prevented 
from testifying in his own behalf, nor 
precluded from introducing any factual 
evidence to prove his innocence. Scheffer 
"was barred merely from introducing 
expert opinion testimony to bolster his 
own credibility."18 
The concurring opinion of Justice 
Kennedy agreed that the ban on poly-
graph evidence served the legitimate in-
terest of ensuring that only reliable 
evidence be presented to a fact-finder, 
.......... 
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and that given the disagreement in the 
legal and scientific community about the 
reliability of polygraph evidence, the 
exclusionary rule "is not so arbitrary or 
disproportionate that it is unconstitu-
tional."19 Nevertheless, the Kennedy 
opinion doubted the "wisdom" of a per 
se rule of exclusion, and argued that 
given the broad discretion of federal 
judges under Daubert in admitting or 
excluding scientific evidence, a "more 
compelling" case for the admissibility 
of polygraph evidence might be pre-
sented in the future. 2o 
The Kennedy opinion emphatically 
disagreed with the principal opinion's 
assertion that a per se ban is appropriate 
in order to preserve the jury's role in 
making credibility determinations and in 
avoiding litigation into peripheral issues. 
The Kennedy opinion accused the prin-
cipal opinion of "overreach[ing]" in ar-
guing that the jury's role is "diminished" 
by the introduction of polygraph evi-
dence.21 Such claim is particularly inapt 
in the context of the military justice sys-
tem given the extensive qualifications of 
military court members and the lessened 
risk that such members will be unduly 
influenced by opinion testimony from 
experts. The Kennedy opinion also re-
jected as "empty rhetoric" the "tired ar-
gument" against allowing juries to hear 
a conclusion about an ultimate issue.22 
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion 
made two arguments. First, he contended 
that Rule 707 violates Article 36(a) of 
the Unifonn Code of Military Justice, 
which authorizes the President to pre-
scribe rules for military proceedings re-
lating to special areas of procedural or 
evidentiary concem.23 However, accord-
ing to Justice Stevens, "there is no iden-
tifiable military concern that justifies the 
President's promulgation of a special 
military rule that is more burdensome to 
defendants in military trials than the 
evidentiary rules applicable to the trial 
of civilians."24 
Second, a blanket exclusion of po-
tentially relevant evidence violates a 
defendant's firmly established constitu-
tional right to present a complete defense 
with relevant and reliable proof. Justice 
Stevens referred to a host of studies plac-
ing the reliability of polygraph tests at 
between 85% to 90%, with critics plac-
ing polygraph accuracy at 70%.25 More-
over, polygraph accuracy is probably 
greater than other types of admissible evi-
dence, such as an expert's testimony on a 
defendant's "future dangerousness" in 
11 41 M.J. 683 (1995) (en banc). 
12 44 M.J. 442, 445 (1996). 
13 118 S. Ct. at 1265. 
14 118 S. Ct. at 1265. 
15 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
16 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 
(1967). 
17 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 
(1973). 
1B 118 S. Ct. at 1268-69. 
19 118 S. Ct. at 1269. 
20 Jd. 
21 Jd. ("the argument demeans and mistakes 
the role and competence of jurors in deciding 
the factual question of guilt or innocence"). 
22 118 S. Ct. at 1269-70. The concurring 
opinion observed that Rule 704(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence specifically allows 
opinions on ultimate issues. The concurring 
opinion also referred to the Advisory 
CommiHee's Notes to Rule 704, which 
observes that the stricture against allowing 
witnesses to express opinions upon ultimate 
issues was "unduly restrictive" and "served 
only to deprive the trier of fact of useful 
information." 
23 See 1 0 U.S.c. § 836(a), which 
authorizes the President to promulgate 
evidentiary rules "which shall, so far as 
practicable, apply the principles of law and 
the rules of evidence generally recognized in 
the trial of criminal cases in the United States 
district courts." 
24 118 S. Ct. 1272. 
25 118 S. Ct. at 1276 n. 21. 
B ENNETT L. GERSHMAN is a pro-fessor at Pace University School 
of Law. His most recent book is Trial 
Error and Misconduct (Lexis Law Pub., 
1997). He received the New York State 
Bar Association's award for outstand-
ing contribution to criminal law educa-
tion in 1991. 
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capital sentencing proceedings,26 or the 
notoriously unreliable testimony of eye-
witnesses.27 Moreover, the belief that 
polygraph evidence will overpersuade a 
fact-finder "reflects a distressing lack of 
confidence in the intelligence of the av-
erage American."28 Finally, no undue 
waste of judicial resources will be occa-
sioned by polygraph evidence. Indeed, 
according to Justice Stevens, preliminary 
proceedings on the admissibility of evi-
dence is a routine predicate for the ad-
mission of all sorts of expert testimony.29 
And there would have been no need for 
collateral proceedings in Scheffer's case 
since the governrnent selected the exam-
iner, the equipment and the questions 
asked of the defendant, and has used the 
identical procedures in hundreds of thou-
sands of other cases.30 
Modem Trend of Limited 
Admissibility 
Scheffer arrives at a time when 
courts are increasingly departing from 
Frye's restrictive approach in favor of a 
more flexible, balanced approach to the 
admissibility of polygraph evidence. 
Scheffer essentially maintains the status 
quo. After Scheffer, courts are not barred 
from continuing to experiment with in-
creasing scientific advances in polygraph 
instrumentation and technique.3! More-
over, Frye has been superseded in the 
federal courts by the landmark opinion 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
tical, Inc. 32 which holds that the "rigid" 
Frye standard is incompatible with the 
"liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence toward the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence.33 If Scheffer had invali-
dated the per se ban of Rule 707, the 
Court would have invalidated the restric-
tive approach of most state courts and 
sent a message to federal courts to exer-
cise broader discretion in favor of poly-
graph admissibility. 
Under current practice, polygraph 
evidence or the fact that a polygraph test 
was administered is admitted under sev-
eral theories. First, references to a poly-
graph test are admissible when the 
evidence is introduced for a purpose 
other than proving the result of the test. 
Thus, statements made by a defendant 
prior to, during the course of, or after 
taking a polygraph are generally admis-
sible.34 Statements may also be admis-
sible when an adverse expert has 
36 / September/October 1998 
........ 
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considered and discounted them in ar-
riving at an opinion on a defendant's 
mental condition.35 Finally, references to 
a polygraph test are allowed when the 
evidence is used to demonstrate an op-
erative fact, such as proving the 
voluntariness of a confession,36 explain-
ing why the police failed to conduct a 
more thorough investigation,37 or prov-
ing the existence of an alibi. 38 
Second, under the guidelines estab-
lished in Daubert, federal courts have ad-
mitted the result of a polygraph test for 
substantive purposes. Examples include 
rebutting an attack on the defendant's 
credibility as a witness,39 supporting the 
defendant's contention that he lacked the 
culpable mental state for the crime,40 ne-
gating an element in the prosecution's 
case,4! or impeaching the credibility of a 
key prosecution witness.42 To these courts, 
the argument that juries will be over-
whelmed by polygraph evidence is over-
stated and underestimates the effect of 
vigorous cross-examination and argument 
in exposing flaws in the testing process. 
Admission of polygraph evidence is also 
subject to safeguards such as requiring 
the party seeking to use the evidence to 
give notice to the adversary, allowing the 
opposing party to conduct his own ex-
amination covering the same questions, 
and using the proof only in conformity 
with appropriate rules of evidence gov-
erning impeachment and rehabilitation.43 
Third, polygraph evidence is 
admitted in most federal circuits and 
many state courts by stipulation of the 
26 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 
898·901 (1983) (expert testimony about 
future dangerousness to determine a 
defendant's eligibility for the death penalty is 
wrong "most of the time" but still admitted in 
evidence). 
27 See Huff, Rattner & Sagarin, Guilty Until 
Proved Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and 
Public Policy, 32 Crime & Delinquency 518, 
524 (1986) (study of wrongful convictions 
concludes that eyewitness misidentification is 
the single most important factor leading to 
conviction); Widacki & Horvath, An 
Experimental investigation of the Relative 
Validity and Utility of the Polygraph Technique 
and Three Other Common Methods of 
Criminal Identification, 23 J. Forensic Sciences 
596, 596-600 (1978) (polygraph evidence 
compares favorably with fingerprint, 
handwriting, and eyewitness evidence). 
28 118 S. Ct. at 1278 (research indicates 
that "jurors do not blindly accept polygraph 
evidence, but that they weigh polygraph evi-
dence along with other evidence"). 
29 118 S. Ct. at 1278 ("If testimony that is 
critical to a fair determination of guilt or inno-
cence could be excluded for that reason, the 
right to a meaningful opportunity to present a 
defense would be an illusion"). 
30 Id. Between 1981 and 1997, the Depart-
ment of Defense conducted over 400,000 
polygraph examinations to resolve issues aris-
ing in counterintelligence, security, and crimi-
nal investigations. See Department of Defense 
Polygraph Program, Annual Polygraph Report 
to Congress. Moreover, as Justice Stevens ar-
gued, "the Government is in no position to ar-
gue that one who has successfully completed 
its carefully developed training program is un-
qualified." 118 S. Ct. at 1278. 
31 See U.S. v. Gilliard, 133 F. 3d 809 
(11 th Cir. 1998) (trial court properly excluded 
polygraph evidence because hybrid control 
question technique not shown to be reliable). 
It should be noted that if a defendant is al-
lowed to introduce exculpatory polygraph evi-
dence, a prosecutor may also be allowed to 
introduce inculpatory test results to prove con-
sciousness of guilt. See United States v. 
Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1279 n. 29 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) ("I can see nothing fundamen-
tally unfair about permitting the results of a 
test taken pursuant to stipulation being admit-
ted into evidence to prove consciousness of 
guilt as well as consciousness of innocence"). 
32 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
33 Applying a plain meaning approach to 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
Court in Daubert held that Rule 702 required 
district courts to determine that expert testi-
mony relating to scientific evidence will assist 
the trier of fact to understand or determine a 
Fact in issue. The first question to be deter-
mined is whether the testimony constitutes "sci-
entific knowledge." The Court provided sev-
eral criteria to guide judges in making that 
determination, including (1) whether the 
theory or technique has been tested, (2) 
whether the theory or tech n ique has been sub-
jected to peer review and publication, (3) the 
known or potential rate aF error, (4) the exist-
ence or maintenance of standards controlling 
the technique's operation, and (5) whether the 
technique is generally accepted within the rel-
evant scientific community. 509 U.S. at 592-
93. The second question under Dallbert is 
whether the testimony will assist the trier of 
fact, that is, whether the testimony relates to 
an issue that is actually in dispute and 
whether such testimony provides a valid scien-
tific connection to the pertinent inquiry. Id. at 
591. 
34 See State v. Hart, 791 P. 2d 1 25 (Or. 
1990); People v. Ray, 430 N.W. 2d 626 
(Mich. 1988); State v. Erickson, 403 N.W. 
2d 281 (Minn. App. 1987). 
35 See United States v. A&S Council Oil 
Co., 947 F. 2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1991). 
36 United States v. Miller, 874 F. 2d 1255 
(9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Johnson, 
816 F. 2d 918 (3d Cir. 1987); People v. 
Melock, 599 N.E. 2d 941 (III. 1992). 
37 United States v. Hall, 805 F. 2d 1410 
(10th Cir. 1986). 
38 United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 
1354 (D. Ariz. 1995). 
39 See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F. 3d 
225 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 13654 (D. Ariz. 
1995). 
40 See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. 
SURP' 877 (D.N.M. 1995). 
1 See United States v. Posado, 57 F. 3d 
428 (5th Cir. 1995). 
42 United States v. A&S Council Oil Co., 
947 F. 2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1991). 
43 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F. 
2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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parties.44 The parties must agree to material matters, such 
as the manner in which the test is conducted, the identity 
of the examiner, the nature of the questions asked, and the 
purpose for which the test will be introduced.45 Courts 
typically require the stipulation to be written, signed, and 
a matter of record, afford the opposing side a broad op-
portunity to cross-examine the expert as to his qualifica-
tions and the limitations of polygraph testing, and give a 
limiting instruction to the jury as to the evidentiary pur-
pose of the testimony.46 
Fourth, polygraph evidence has been admitted under 
the evidentiary rule that allows a party to impeach or reha-
bilitate a witness through opinion or reputation evidence 
with respect to the witness' character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness.47 For example, if a defendant took the stand 
and denied having committed the crime, and the prosecutor 
impeached his credibility, the defendant would be permit-
ted to rehabilitate his credibility by introducing polygraph 
evidence that demonstrated his character for truthfulness.48 
Moreover, a defendant could support his own credibility by 
stating that he passed a polygraph examination in connec-
tion with the case.49 
Conclusion 
In those jurisdictions that do not unconditionally fore-
close the admission of polygraph evidence and allow the 
court to use discretion with respect to the introduction of 
scientific evidence, Scheffer will not stand in the way of the 
continued use of polygraph evidence. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that a majority of the Supreme Court apparently disap-
proves of a per se rule of polygraph exclusion, Scheffer 
supports a balanced and flexible approach to the use of 
polygraph evidence under rigorous standards and safeguards. 
Several federal and state courts have allowed the use of 
polygraph evidence in various contexts noted above, and 
probably will continue to do so. Although per se rules of 
exclusion presently do not offend constitutional principles, 
the emerging body of constitutional doctrine protecting a 
defendant's right to present relevant evidence to support a 
defense may one day include a limited right to present 
polygraph evidence. ~ 
44 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F. 2d at 1534 nn. 16, 
17. By contrast, a privately commissioned polrgraph test which is 
nknown, to either until after its completion is 0 extremely dubious 
probative value. See United States v. Sherlin, 67 F. 3d 1208 (6th 
Cir. 1995); Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F. 3d 658 (6th Cir. 
1994) .• 
45 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F. 2d at 1536. 
46 See State v. Marti, 290 N.W. 2d 570 (Iowa 1980); Codie v. 
State, 313 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975); State v. Valdez, 371 P. 2d 
894 (Ariz. 1962). But see State v. Boyd, 673 N.E. 2d 607, 611 
(Ohio "xpp. 1996) (agreement by parties that polygraph examiner 
may not be examined concerning possibilities for error in testing 
process!violates public policy as giving jury misimpression that 
examiner's opinion was sacrosanct). 
47 Se~ Fed. R. Evid. 608(a). 
48 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F. 2d at 1536; United 
States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1363. But see United States v. 
Castillo) 1997 WL 83746 .n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (rejecting view that 
p0!rgraph expert opines as to witness' truthful character). 
4 See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1364 (testi-
mony a8missible under "impeachment by contradiction" exception 
to Fed. IR. Evid. 608(b)). 
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